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Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to
property could not be diminished without paying for every such
change in the general law.'

I.
F

INTRODUCTION

rom the white sandy beaches outlining the state to the lush pine
forests covering the state's interior, Florida abounds with natural

I. Justice Holmes' words in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922),
are possibly more true today than they were more than 70 years ago. As the language suggests,
however, government's regulatory power is not absolute. This Comment will examine the Florida Legislature's recent attempts to define the extent of this power.
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beauty. 2 Confronted with the state's staggering population growth and
corresponding urbanization, the Florida Legislature has taken the initiative and over the past twenty years has attempted to create a regulatory climate favorable to the protection of the state's environment.
From the Comprehensive Planning Act of I9751 through the Growth

Management Act of 19854 and to the recent merger of the Department
of Natural Resources and the Department of Environmental Regulation,' the Florida Legislature has continued to provide regulatory mechanisms to protect the natural beauty of the state for future
generations .6
These efforts, however, are often seen to be diametrically opposed
to the private property rights which Floridians have long held sacred.1
While a property owner adversely affected by an environmental or
land-use regulation may bring an inverse condemnation suit against
the state, the "ad hoc" analysis courts use in determining these cases
2. In fact, the name Florida means "land of flowers." The state was given this colorful
name by the Spanish explorer, Juan Ponce de Leon, who discovered the State on April 2, 1513 in
his search for the mythical Fountain of Youth. See ALLEN MoRiRs, THE FLORIMA HANDBOOK
1993-1994 391 (1993).
3. Ch. 75-257, 1975 Fla. Laws 794 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 163.3161-.3211 (1993)).
4. Ch. 85-55, 1985 Fla. Laws 207. One commentator noted that without the Growth Management Act, we would be continuing to "spread[ I a thin veneer of development, like peanut
butter, across our natural landscape." See Thomas G. Pelham, Shaping Florida's Future, 7 J.
L~AND Use & ENVTL. L. 321, 323 (1992) (discussing the Act's goal of containing "urban
sprawl").
5. The Florida Environmental Reorganization Act of 1993, ch. 93-213, § 3, 1993 Fla. Laws
2129, 2133. However, another piece of 1993 legislation may ultimately have the greater impact
on land-use regulation and environmental protection in Florida. See ch. 93-206, §§ 6, 52, 1993
Fla. Laws 1887, 1893, 1948 (emphasizing intergovernmental coordination in local comprehensive
plans). For a more complete discussion of this Act, see David L. Powell, Manaking Florida's
Growth: The Next Generation, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 223 (1993).
6. The importance of protecting Florida's environment is also emphasized throughout the
State Comprehensive Plan. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 187.201(9)(a) (1993) ("Florida shall ensure
that development and marine resource use and beach access improvements in coastal areas do
not endanger . . . important natural resources."); id. § 187.201(10)(a) ("Florida shall protect
and acquire unique natural habitats and ecological systems ....
); id. § 187.201(16)(a) ("In
recognition of the importance of preserving the natural resources and enhancing the quality of
life of the state, development shall be directed to those areas lwhich can] accommodate growth
in an environmentally acceptable manner.").
7. See, e.g., FLA. CoNsT. art. X, § 6 ("No private property shall be taken extept for a
public purpose and with full compensation therefor paid to each owner ... ."). While the language in the Florida Constitution is similar to that of the Takings Clause in the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the eminent domain provision in the Florida Constitution
provides greater protection of private property rights. See TALEOT D'ALEmBERTE, TE FLORIDA
STATE CoNsTrunoN-A REFERENCE GUImE 140 (1991). The State Comprehensive Plan also recognizes the inherent conflict between private property rights and environmental protection. See
FL.. STAT. § 187.201(15)(a) (1993) ("Florida shall protect private property rights and recognize
the existence of legitimate and often competing public and private interests in land use regulations and other government action.").
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creates additional uncertainty for property owners.' In the 1993 Regular Session, the conflict between land-use regulation and private property rights again came to the forefront. House Bill 1437, introduced
by Representative Burt Harris 9 and cosponsored by over fifty members, proposed to statutorily define when a regulatory taking occurs.' 0
This bill did not pass, but it led to the creation of a study commission
charged with assessing the balance between private property rights and
land-use regulation within the state." The results of the commission's
study were eventually incorporated into a piece of pro-private property rights legislation introduced in 1994.12 Although this proposed
legislation died on the Calendar, the issue will likely resurface in upcoming legislative sessions. Therefore, the work product of the study
commission and the subsequent legislative action on the taking issue
warrant considerable discussion.
This Comment will attempt to assess the impact which the 1994 legislation could have had on the delicate balance between environmental
protection and private property rights in Florida. Part II will provide
an overview of the convoluted federal and Florida takings jurisprudence which initially prompted the introduction of House Bill 1437 in
1993. Parts III and IV will discuss previous legislative attempts to address the taking issue and will trace the history of the 1994 property
rights legislation from its genesis in the 1993 Session, to the study
commission, and to its development during the 1994 Session. Part V
will suggest the path future legislatures should take in assessing the
private property rights issue to provide a workable statutory balance
between environmental protection and private property rights.
II.

TIE

MUDDY WATERS OF TAKrNGo

JURISPRUDENCE

It is without question that a governmental entity which condemns
property through its power of eminent domain must pay the owner
"just compensation." The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
requires no less.' 3 When this power is exercised, there is said to have
8. For a discussion of judicial takings analysis and the lack of certainty provided by the
"ad hoc" nature of this analysis, see discussion infra part II.
9. Dem., Lake Placid.
10. See Fla. HB 1437 (1993). The bill proposed a 40% reduction in value as the threshold
for a regulatory taking. A regulation which decreased the value of property by 40% or more
would trigger a requirement that the governmental unit promulgating the regulation must either
purchase the subjected property or rescind the regulation.
i1. See Fla. Exec. Order No. 93-150 (June 4, 1993).
12. See Fla. CS for HB 485 & HB 1967 (1994). For a complete discussion of this legislation,
see infra text accompanying notes 190-220.
13. See also FLA. CONST. art. X, §6 (Eminent Domain Clause); FLA. STAT. ch. 73 (1993).
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been" a taking of the property. A taking may also result where the
government has not formally condemned the property but has effectively done so through excessive regulation of the property. 14 The
mechanism through which a property owner recovers compensation
for this type of taking is an inverse condemnation suit against the governmental entity which promulgated the offensive regulation."5 This
Part describes the analysis which federal
and Florida courts use to de6
termine when such a taking occurs.'
A.

FederalCases

Justice Holmes uttered the most famous words in takings jurisprudence in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon 7 when he announced
"[tihe general rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a
certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking. '" This phrase signaled the birth of a new type of taking claimthe regulatory taking. The Court recognized that although a land use
regulation which "goes too far" does not "take" an individual's
property in the physical sense, its effect is the same. 9 The brevity and
simplicity of Holmes' rule is its beauty, but also its blemish for it begs
the question of how far is too far.
The United States Supreme Court has consistently recognized that
inherent in state police power is the authority to prevent public nuisances. 20 A public nuisance is defined as a property use which endangers the public health, safety, or morals. 2' For example, operation of a
brick mill or quarry in a residential area has been deemed a "noxious" use of property and thus has been prohibited as a public nui-

14.

See United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 255-57 (1980) (discussing the legal and prac-

tical differences between an inverse condemnation suit and a condemnation proceeding).
15. While "inverse condemnation" is the precise title for these actions, the issue to be determined by the court is whether the governmental action effected a "taking" of the property,
thereby implicating the constitutional requirement of just compensation. See id. at 257. Accordingly, inverse condemnation cases are often referred to as "regulatory taking cases" or simply
''taking cases."

16.

This Part does not attempt to provide an exhaustive discussion of takings jurispru-

dence, but will provide the reader with the background necessary to understand the issues ad-

dressed in the 1994 property rights legislation. For a more complete discussion of regulatory
takings, see Patrick Wiseman, When the End Justifies the Means: Understanding Takings Jurisprudence in a Legal System with Integrity, 63 ST. JomH's L. REv. 433 (1988).
17. 260U.S. 393 (1922).
18.
19.

Id. at 415 (emphasis added).
Id. at 414.

20. See Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592-93 (1962); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 658, 667 (1887); Fertilizing
Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659, 667 (1878).

21.

See Mugler, 123 U.S. at 659.
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sance.22 It is a legislative function to define what constitutes a public
nuisance, and courts are not at liberty to question the legislature's
judgment so long as there -is a "substantial relationship" between the
regulation and the protection of the public health, safety, or morals. 3
Because "all property ... is held under the implied obligation that
. .. [its] use... shall not be injurious to the community," the bundle
of rights making up an owner's property does not-and could neverinclude the right to use the property in a nuisance-like manner.a Accordingly, where the legislature defines a property use as a public nuisance, the state has no duty to compensate the property owner when it
prevents that use, notwithstanding a substantial or complete diminution in value resulting from the regulation of the property.25
As the "substantial relationship" test suggests, the validity of a
land-use regulation initially turns on whether the regulation is a legitimate exercise of the police power. In this regard, an "essential nexus"
is required between the regulation's effect on the property and the
public interest purportedly served by the regulation.m Where no nexus
exists, the regulation will be held invalid as an unreasonable exercise
of the police power. 27 A regulation found offensive under this analysis
is void, and does not give rise to a just compensation claim; however,
the property owner is entitled to compensation for damages suffered
during the period in which the regulation deprived him all use of the
property.Y
22. See Hadacheck, 239 U.S. at 405; Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 593.
23. SeeMugler, 123U.S. at661.
24. See id. at 665.
25. The ability of the legislature to "newly decree" a property use a public nuisance is now
in question. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2899 (1992) ("[Tlhe
legislature's recitation of a [nuisance] justification cannot be the basis for departing from [the]
categorical rule that total regulatory takings must be compensated.").
26. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987). In Dolan v. City
of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994), the Court expanded on the Nollan holding as it relates to
exactions imposed on property owners as conditions for the grant of building permits and zoning
changes. The Court held that in addition to an "essential nexus," the government is required to
show a "rough proportionality" between the exaction and the proposed development's impact
on the public. Id. at 2319. Although the impact need not be specifically attributable to the proposed development, the government must make some effort to quantify its findings that the
exaction is necessary to protect the public interest. Id. In this regard, the government must prove
that:
the requirement has some reasonable relationship or nexus to the use to which the
property is being made [rather than that the requirement] is merely being used as an
excuse for taxing property simply because at that particular moment the landowner is
asking the city for some license or permit.
Id. (quoting Simpson v. North Platte, 292 N.W.2d 297, 301 (Neb. 1980)).
27. Nolan, 483 U.S. at 837; see also Wiseman, supra note 16, at 438 (describing the practical difference between a regulation declared invalid as a violation of due process and a regulation deemed unconstitutional because it goes "too far").
28. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304,
321 (1987).
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Even if the "essential nexus" requirement is met and the regulation
furthers a legitimate public purpose, the regulation may still effect a
taking of the property. Accordingly, the court's focus then shifts to
assessing whether the regulation goes "too far." As Justice Holmes
suggested in Mahon, this question involves a balancing of the public
interest served by the regulaiion and the extent to which the individual's private property interest is affected. 29 While the balancing test
remains "ad hoc," the Court has identified various factors to be considered in the analysis.
The three-pronged balancing test set forth in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York 0 is generally acknowledged as the
genesis of the "modern" taking analysis.3 The issue in Penn Central
was whether a New York historic preservation law which prohibited
Penn Central from erecting a fifty story high-rise office tower on its
property above historic Grand Central Terminal effected a taking of
Penn Central's property. 2 The Court determined that the law did not
effect a taking of the property. 3 The Court's analysis balanced the
diminution in value to the property and interference with Penn Central's investment-backed expectations with the public interest served
by the regulation. 3
The Court held that the city's designation of historic properties,
such as Grand Central Terminal, as landmarks was a legitimate state
interest since landmark preservation has a beneficial effect on the
quality of life in the city, and the landmarks are economically and
aesthetically valuable community resources .5 The Court also held that
the diminution in value of Penn Central's property alone was not significant enough to effect a taking. 36 Finally, the Court held that the
preservation law did not interfere with Penn Central's investment-

29.

See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413-14 (1922).

30. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
31. See Michael A. Pfundstein & Maria C. Charles, Florida'sCoastal Construction Regulations and the Taking Issue: The Complexities of Drawing Lines in the Sand, 6 J. LAND UsE &
ENvrL. L. 255, 266 (1991); cf. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (holding that a
taking occurs where the regulation does not advance a legitimate state interest or denies an
owner all economically viable use of his property).
32. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 107.
33. Id. at 138.
34. Id. at 124.
35. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 134 (1978).
36. Id. at 131-32 (comparing situations where the Court found no taking although market
value declined by 75% to 87.5%). Additionally, the Court noted that to the extent Penn Central
was burdened by the designation of its property as a historic landmark, there was a "reciprocity
of advantage" received by Penn Central as a result of other properties in the city also designated
as historic landmarks. Id. at 132.

1994]

PROPERTY RIGHTS

backed expectations regarding the use of its property." Specifically,
the Court noted that Penn Central could continue to use the property
as a railroad terminal with office space just as it had for the past
sixty-five years.3 s The Court also noted that the prohibition of an office tower did not foreclose the possibility that construction of some
9
other structure would be permitted.3
In Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,40 the Court
again emphasized in its taking analysis the importance of interference
with investment-backed expectations. In that case, a regulation restricting the mining of coal was held not to effect a taking of Keystone's property since only two percent of its total coal reserves would
actually be affected by the regulation. 41 Similarly, a recent case from
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Reahard v. Lee
County, 42 suggests that interference with investment-backed expectations is the most important factor in the taking analysis.
In 1992, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Lucas v. South Carolina
CoastalCouncil, 4 which many hoped would finally clarify takings jurisprudence, or at least provide the courts and legislatures greater direction in applying and weighing the factors set out in Penn Central.
The decision did neither. Instead, the "missile" 44 launched by the
Court left a crater in the already moon-like surface of takings jurisprudence and its reverberations are being felt throughout Florida's
land-use and environmental regulations.
The facts of Lucas are relatively simple. In 1986, developer David
Lucas purchased two oceanfront lots on the Isle of Palms in South
Carolina for $975,000 on which he intended to build single-family
homes. 45 In 1988 the South Carolina Legislature enacted the Beach
Front Management Act (BFMA) which effectively made it impossible
for Lucas to construct any permanent habitable structures on his
properties. 46 Lucas brought suit in state court claiming that the BFMA

37. Id. at 136.
38. Id.
39. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 137 (1978).
40. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
41. Id. at 496.
42. 968 F.2d 1131, 1136 (11 th Cir. 1992) ("[Plerhaps most importantly, what was the diminution in the investment-backed expectations of the landowner, if any, after passage of the regulation?").
43. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
44. In his dissent, Justice Blackmun expressed concern over the breadth of the new "per
se" rule and chastised the majority for "launch[ing] a missile to kill a mouse." Id. at 2904
(Blackmun, J.,dissenting).
45. Id. at 2889.
46. Id.
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rendered his tracts "valueless" and that the regulations went "too
far" and effected a taking of his properties .47 The trial court agreed
and ordered the state to pay Lucas "just compensation" of
$1,232,387.50.4 The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed. 49
In reversing the South Carolina Supreme Court, the Court announced a "new" takings rule by holding that a categorical taking
occurs where a regulation deprives the property owner "all economically beneficial or productive use" of his property." As quickly as the
Court announced this per se rule, however, it noted an exception to
the rule.5 This exception allows the state to avoid compensation
where the regulation is merely prohibiting a use which would not have
been permitted under "background principles of [state] nuisance and
52
property law."
The Court did not clearly define what it meant by "background
principles of [state] nuisance and property law," but a plain meaning
of the language suggests that the exception includes only those principles which are inherent in the state's common law. This, however,
grounds the determination of prohibited, nuisance-like uses in those
uses prohibited at the time the owner purchased his property. 3 In this
regard, the legislature is restricted in defining a particular use as a
"'new" nuisance without having to compensate an owner who is
thereby denied all economically beneficial use of his property. Stated
another way, the exception provides that the only instance where the
state can deprive a property owner all economically beneficial use of
his property and avoid compensation is where the state is prohibiting
a use which was not inherent in the owner's title when he purchased
the property.5 4 If -he owner never had the right to use the property in
a given manner, nothing was "taken" when the state decreed that the
owner could not use his property in that manner.
Although the Court noted that nuisance law is not static and that
"changed circumstances or new knowledge may make what was previ47. Id. at 2890.
48. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2890 (1992).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 2893-94. Although Justice Scalia claimed the "per se" rule was a long standing
test of the Court, he cited no cases directly supporting this categorical rule.
51. Seeid.at2901.
52. Id. at 2901-02. Arguably, the exception to the "per se" rule suffers from the same flaws
which led the Court to reject the distinction between harm-preventing and benefit-promoting
regulations. Specifically, the balancing test, which generally accompanies a nuisance determination, erodes the "objective, value-free basis" which the majority attempted to accomplish with a
"per se" rule. See Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
53. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2899 (1992); id.at 2913
n.16 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
54. See id. at 2899.
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ously permissible no longer so," the exception to the categorical rule
focuses on whether the use was prohibited by background principles
of state nuisance law. 5 1 Implicit in the exception is that there is a
closed class of property uses which constitute nuisances and that the
state can avoid compensation for a complete deprivation of value only
56
where it is making one of these background principles explicit.
Where a use is "newly legislated or decreed" to be a nuisance, however, the state must compensate an owner denied "all economically

beneficial use" of his property." In reality, this should have little adverse impact on a state's ability to prospectively define a property use
as a nuisance because both the majority and the dissent in Lucas acknowledged that the categorical rule is triggered only in the rare case
where a regulation denies all economically beneficial use of property.18
Arguably, this interpretation overrules cases such as Mugler v.
Kansas"9 and Hadacheck v. Sebastian6° in which the Court upheld legislative determinations of property uses that constitute a public harm
and could therefore be prohibited under the state's police power. The
Mugler line of cases is distinguishable, however, because in those
cases the Court never upheld a legislative determination that a property use constitutes a nuisance where such a determination denies the
property owner "all economically beneficial use" of his property. 6
Because the "per se" rule is applicable only in the narrow class of
cases where all economically beneficial use of an owner's property is
denied, in cases where the property owner retains at least some use of,
or value in, his property, he may still be able to succeed in an inverse
condemnation suit based on an analysis of the factors set out in Penn
Central.2 In Reahard, the court suggested additional issues which
should be addressed in the takings analysis where the regulation deprives the property owner less than all use of his property. 63

55. Id. at 2901.
56. Id. at 2899-2901.
57. Id. at 2900.
58. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2894 (1992); id. at 2904
(Blackmun, J.,dissenting).
59. 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (closing of a brewery).
60. 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (prohibition on brick making in a residential area).
61. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2896-97. But see McNulty v. Town of Indialantic, 727 F. Supp.
604, 609 (M.D. Fla. 1989) ("[Tlhe government can destroy all economic use if necessary to avoid
a public nuisance or nuisance like use."); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480
U.S. 470, 492 (1987) ("[T]he public interest in preventing activities similar to public nuisances is
a substantial one, which in many instances has not required compensation.").
62. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2895 n.8; see also Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 18
F.3d 1560, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
63. See Reahard v. Lee County, 968 F.2d 1131, 1136 (11th Cir. 1992). The eight factors
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In summary, the current federal takings jurisprudence consists of a
three step analysis. Step 1: Is there a "nexus" between the public interest purportedly served by the regulation and the effect of the regulation on the property? 64 If not, the regulation is an invalid exercise of
the police power and is void. Even if the "nexus" exists, the regulation may still effect a taking of the property if, as determined in Steps
2 or 3, it "goes too far." Step 2: Does the regulation deprive "all
economically beneficial or productive use" of the property? If so, under Lucas, the owner is entitled to just compensation unless the regulation fits into the narrow "nuisance" exception. Step 3: If the
regulation deprives the owner of less than all use of his property, the
court will determine whether a taking occurred based on an "ad hoc"
analysis considering the factors set out in Reahardand Penn Central.
B. FloridaCases
An analysis of takings jurisprudence in Florida must begin with the
landmark case of Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc.6S Estuary Properties owned nearly 6500 acres of property near Fort Myers, Florida,
on which it planned to construct a residential development. 6 More
than half of Estuary's property was covered by mangroves and only
526 acres of the property could be classified as nonwetlands *67 Estuary
Properties applied for, and was denied a dredge and fill permit pursuant to section 380.06, FloridaStatutes.68 After an unsuccessful administrative appeal, Estuary Properties brought suit against the state
9
claiming that the denial of the permit constituted a taking.
The Florida Supreme Court held that the permit denial did not constitute a taking. 0 The court noted that because Estuary Properties
could amend its plan and still develop almost half of its property, the
spelled out by the court are: the history of the property; the history of the development; the
history of zoning and regulation; how the development changed when title passed; the present
nature and extent of the property; the reasonable expectations of the landowner under state
common law; the reasonable expectations of the neighboring landowners under state common
law; and perhaps most important, the diminution in the investment-backed expectations of the
landowner after the passage of the regulation. Id.
64. Subsequent to the Court's decision in Dolan v. Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994), however,
Step I actually consists of two "sub-steps" where conditions or exactions are involved. With the
addition of the "rough proportionality" requirement, a regulation, condition, or exaction must
be related both in natureand extent to the proposed development. Id. at 2317-20.
65. 399 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 1981).
66. Id. at 1376.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1377. The denial was based upon the adverse impact which the planned development would have on the surrounding water quality and ecosystem.
69. Id.
70. Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 399 So. 2d 1374, 1380-81 (Fla. 1981).
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diminution in the value was not severe enough to establish a taking. 7'
The court also stated that the denial of the permit did not interfere
with Estuary Properties' investment-backed expectations regarding the
use of its property. 72 Specifically, the court noted that Florida's extensive statutory scheme regulating the filling of wetlands could not give
rise to a reasonable expectation that a permit to develop the property

in any manner would be granted." Further, the court recognized that
"[p]rotection of environmentally sensitive areas and pollution preven74
tion are legitimate concerns within the police power."
In the course of its analysis, the court noted that there is "no settled
formula for determining when [a] valid exercise of police power stops
and an impermissible encroachment on private property rights begins." ' 7 Thus, Florida courts also use an "ad hoc" analysis to determine whether governmental action effects a taking of private
property. In this regard, the court in Estuary Properties identified a
number of factors to be considered in the analysis.7 6 Although the
analysis used by Florida courts is nearly identical to that used in federal courts, there are some issues which warrant discussion.
The court in Estuary Propertiesnoted that a regulation which prevents a public harm is a legitimate exercise of the police power while a
regulation merely conferring a public benefit is beyond the scope of
the police power. 77 In Lucas, however, the U.S. Supreme Court ridiculed the distinction between harm-preventing and benefit-conferring

71. Id. at 1382. The county commission which denied Estuary's permit application noted
that a permit would be approved if Estuary reduced the density of its proposed development by
half. Id. at 1377.
72. Id. at 1383.
73. Id. at 1382 ("[A]n owner of land has no absolute and unlimited right to change the
essential natural character of his land so as to use it for a purpose for which it was unsuited in its
natural state and which injuries [sic] the rights of others.") (quoting Just v. Marinette County,
201 N.W.2d 761, 768 (Wisc. 1972)). But see Vatalaro v. Department of Envtl. Reg., 601 So. 2d
1223, 1229 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992) (constructive notice that the property is subject to environmental regulation is insufficient to defeat an owner's taking claim where all economically viable use
is precluded), rev. denied, 613 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1992).
74. See Estuary Properties, 399 So. 2d at 1381.
75. Id. at 1374.
76. Id. at 1380-81. The factors stated by the court were whether there is a physical invasion
of the property; whether the regulation precludes all economically reasonable use of the property; whether the regulation confers a public benefit or -prevents a public harm; whether the
regulation promotes the health, safety, welfare, or morals of the public; whether the regulation
is arbitrarily and capriciously applied; and the extent to which the regulation curtails investmentbacked expectations. Id. Interestingly, the court did not cite Penn Central as a basis for the
factors used in its taking "formula" although the factors used by the court to balance the impact
of the regulation on the property owner against the public purposes served by the regulation are
essentially the same as those set out in Penn Central.
77. Id. at 1382.
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regulations. The Court noted that the distinction is "often in the eye
of the beholder" and "is difficult, if not impossible, to discern on an
objective, value-free basis." ' Even in Estuary Propertiesthe court admitted that the distinction is not often clear.19 Accordingly, the continued viability of this distinction in Florida law is doubtful.
In contrast, the issue of the conceptual severance which was mentioned, but not decided in Lucas,80 is well-settled in Florida. Conceptual severance effectively redefines the property interest subject to the
taking claim and shifts the court's taking analysis from the regulation's effect on the property as a whole to its effect on the portion of
the property burdened by the regulation. 8 ' Application of the conceptual severance doctrine is typically beneficial to property owners because it narrows the property interest against which a taking is
measured. This doctrine, however, is not recognized in Florida. 2 In
Department of EnvironmentalRegulation v. Schindler,3 the court unequivocally stated that "[tihe focus is on the nature and extent of the
interference with the landowner's rights in the parcel as a whole in
determining whether a taking of private property has occurred."' ' For
example, where the denial of a dredge and fill permit for 1.85 acres of
a 3.5-acre tract is challenged as a taking of the property, the denial's

78. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2897, 2899 (1992).
79. Estuary Properties, 399 So. 2d at 1382.
80. SeeLucas, 112S. Ct. at2894 n.7.
81. Id. Justice Scalia acknowledged that the "per se" rule announced by the majority is
more "rhetorical" than helpful since the court did not address the conceptual severance issue
and did not clarify the property interest subject to the rule. In Florida Rock Indus. v. United
States, 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994), the court framed the conceptual severance (i.e., partial
taking) issue as follows:
The question remains, does a partial deprivation resulting from a regulatory imposition, that is, a situation in which a regulation deprives the owner of a substantial part
but not essentially all of the economic use or value of the property, constitute a partial
taking, and is it compensable as such? [The] question has been much debated (but]
...the Court's decisions to date have not provided an answer.
Id. at 1568. But see Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978)
(.'Taking' jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to
determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated.").
82. But see Ronald L. Weaver & Mark D. Solov, New Standards, If not Greater Protections, Against Land Use Regulations, 66.FiA. B.J. 58, 60-61 (Dec, 1992) (arguing in favor of the
application of the conceptual severance doctrine in Florida).
83. 604 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). rev. denied, 613 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1992).
84. Id. at 568 (quoting Fox v. Treasure Coast Regional Planning Council, 442 So. 2d 221,
225 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)); see also Department of Trasp. v. Weisenfeld, 617 So. 2d 1071, 1073
(Fla. 5th DCA 1993) ("[Tlhe owner's affected property interest must be viewed as a whole."),
approved, 640 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1994); Palm Beach County v. Wright, 641 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 1994);
Department of Envtl. Reg. v. MacKay, 544 So. 2d 1065 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); Graham v. Estuary
Properties, fnc., 399 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 1981).
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impact on the entire 3.5 acres should be considered as a whole in the
taking analysis."5
The Florida Supreme Court has not specifically adopted the Lucas
rule; however, its analysis in Vatalaro v. Department of Environmental Regulation86 suggests that the rule will be adhered to in Florida
cases. In that case, the court held that, notwithstanding the laudable
purposes of wetland preservation, where a property owner is left with
no "economically viable use" of her property as a result of a permit
denial, the property has been "taken."8 The court distinguished Estuary Properties based on the fact that Estuary Properties could still
develop half of its property whereas Vatalaro's use of her property
was limited to "just looking at it.""" Accordingly, the court did not
analyze the permit denial based on the factors set forth in Estuary
Properties, but instead held that the permit denial triggered a "per
se" taking of Vatalaro's property. 9
Ill. PREvious LEoIsiATrWE ATTEMPTS TO ADDRESS THE TAKING ISSUE
As discussed above, the taking issue is not a recent phenomenon
and judicial attempts to clarify the factors which lead to a takings
determination have continued over the past seventy years. In recent
years, legislation has been introduced in a number of states, including
Florida, which attempts to statutorily define when such action "goes
too far." 9 Similarly, a bill is before Congress which would require
85. See Schindler, 604 So. 2d at 568.
86. 601 So. 2d 1223 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992), rev. denied, 613 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1992). In this case,
Vatalaro applied for a permit to construct two homes with septic tank systems on 11 acres of
property she had purchased for over $125,000. Id. at 1224-25. The Department of Environmental Regulation (DER) denied the permit because the property was located within a wetland and it
determined that Vatalaro's project would harm the wetland's ecosystem. Id. at 1225. Because the
permit denial left the property suitable for only "limited passive recreational use," Vatalaro
brought suit against DER for inverse condemnation. Id. at 1227, 1229.
87. Id. at 1229. This suggests that even where a property owner has constructive notice that
his property is subject to environmental regulation, he may still recover compensation for a
taking where he is denied all use of his property. Cf. Estuary Properties, 399 So. 2d at 1382-83
(an owner's "subjective expectation" that the property may be used in a given manner does not
give rise to a taking claim).
88. See Vatalaro, 601 So. 2d at 1228-29.
89. Id. at 1229. The court's adoption of a "per se" rule when all economically viable use is
deprived proved to be prophetic since Vatalaro was decided a month before Lucas. The Florida
Supreme Court declined to review the decision in light of Lucas and therefore it is uncertain
whether the denial of the dredge and fill permit in a wetland would have fit into Lucas's "nuisance" exception. Vatalaro v. Department of Envtl. Reg., 613 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1992) (denying
review).
90. See Fla. HH 1437 (1 993); Fla. SB 1000 (1993); Fla. CS for HB 485 & HB 1967 (1994). In
1993, "takings" bills were introduced in 30 other states; however, only Indiana, Nevada, and
Utah passed some type of property rights legislation. See STATE TA~iwas BrLis/LAws 1993 SEssIoNs, AmsEcAN RaSOURCES INFO ATiON NETwosu, at 1 (July 14, 1993) (on file with Florida
State University Law Review, Fla. St. Univ. College of Law, Tallahassee, Fla.).
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federal agencies to establish procedures to assess whether a proposed
regulation may result in a taking of private property. 91 This Part provides a history of the previous Florida legislation relating to the taking
issue and highlights the pending federal legislation.
A.

Governor's PropertyRights Study Commission I

In the mid-1970's, both the legislative and executive branches of
Florida government undertook studies of the taking issue. The Governor's Property Rights Study Commission (Study Commission) and the
Senate Select Committee on Property Rights and Land Acquisition
(Select Committee) focused on the uncertainty surrounding judicial
treatment of the taking issue as well as the need for a process to challenge agency action which places an inordinate burden on an individual property owner. Although the recommendations of these studies
were not immediately adopted, legislation enacted in 1978 set forth
the remedies available to property owners "substantially affected by a
final action of any agency with respect to a permit.''9
In 1974, in light of the growing conflict between protection of the
state's natural resources and individual property rights raised by the
enactment of the growth management legislation, Governor Rubin
Askew issued an executive order creating the Study Commission. 93
The Study Commission was composed of a diverse group of interested
parties and was charged with "conduct[ing] a comprehensive study of
private property rights and the public need for land use regulations.' '94
Over its ten-week life, the Study Commission held several workshops
and focused its attention on the "possibility and feasibility of compensating owners whose property interests are substantially diminished by stringent environmental regulations." 95 On March 17, 1975,
the Study Commission issued its final report in which it listed eight

91.

See S. 2006, 103rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1994). For a brief discussion of previous and

pending federal legislation, see infra part III.C.
92. See ch. 78-85, 1978 Fla. Laws 124. For a discussion of this legislation, see infra text
accompanying notes 107-25. For a more complete analysis, see Robert M. Rhodes, Compensating Police Power Takings: Chapter 78-85, Laws of Florida, 52 FLA. B.J. 741 (1978).
93. Fla. Exec. Order No. 74-71 (Dec. 20, 1974).
94.

Id. The commission was composed of "[t]wenty-six legislators and private citizens,

knowledgeable in the fields of law, taxation, property development, environmental protection,
and agriculture .. " See FIsAL REPORT OF THE GovasNOR'S PROPERTY RIGHTS STUDY COMMUSsioN, at 2 (Mar. 17, 1975) (available at Dep't of State, Div. of Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT OF TE STUDY CoMInssoN].
95. FINAL REPORT OF STUDY ComissioN at 2-3.
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"policy statements" relating to the taking issue. 96 The Study Commission further recognized that the issues it was charged with addressing
were complex and that additional consideration was necessary for a
complete study. Accordingly, as its final policy statement, the Study
Commission recommended that "[t]he work of the Governor's Property Rights Study Commission should be continued by the same or a
similar group, for at least an additional twelve months with adequate
funding."'
Although the Study Commission's tenure was not extended, the Select Committee was created in 1976 to continue the study of private
property rights.98 The Select Committee had two functions. Most important was the Select Committee's direction to examine the "taking
issue.'99 In the course of its study, the Select Committee reviewed the

96. The policy statements included:
[1.] A system should be provided whereby compensation is paid for any regulation
that unduly diminishes the value of property, even though it does not constitute an
unconstitutional taking without compensation.
[2.1 Any system of compensable regulation should allow regulating governments an
opportunity to modify, rescind or grant a variance in lieu of compensation....
[3.] Diminution of pre-regulation market value that exceeds a certain threshold should
be compensated.
[4.J Compensation or other relief should be determined by a judicial proceeding rather
than by administrative proceeding.
[5.]
Any system of statewide compensable regulation should speak to all governmentally imposed regulations.
Id. at 6-7 (policy statements numbers I through 5).
97. Id. at 11 (policy statement number 8).
98. The Select Committee was appointed by then-Senate President Dempsey Barron, Democrat, Panama City, 1957-1988; and consisted of Senators Philip Lewis (Chairman), Democrat,
1970-1980; W.D. Childers, Democrat, Pensacola; Tom Gallen, Warren Henderson, Republican,
Venice, House 1966-1967, Senate 1963-1966, 1967-1984; Kenneth Plante, 1967-1978; Alan Trask,
1968-1982; and John Ware, 1965-1982. See FLORIDA SENATE SELECT COMtrEE ON PROPERTY
RIGHTS AND LAND ACQUISITION, FINAL REPORT ON THE "TAKINO ISSUE," at 1 (Apr. 15, 1976)
(available at Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT
ON nm "TAKING IssUE"].
99. The Select Committee's other function was to study the acquisition of environmentally
endangered lands and outdoor recreational land programs. See FLORIDA SENATE SELECT COMITTEE ON PROPERTY RIGHTS AND LAND AcQuismoN, CHAIRMAN'S OPENING COMENTS, at 3 (Sept.
16, 1975) (available at Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.). As to the taking
issue, the Select Committee was charged with answering the following questions:
1.At what point does a valid land regulation change appearance and become a taking,
requiring the government to compensate the landowner?
2. Should landowners be compensated at all for diminution in value occurring because
of land regulations?
3. If landowners should be compensated, when and how will compensation be made?
4. What is the correct balance that should exist between government's duty and authority to provide valid regulations and the private landowner's right to realize economic benefits from land and a landowner's privilege to recognize future goals
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existing takings jurisprudence as well as the efforts of others who had
studied the property rights issue and held several workshops on the
taking issue. Committee staff prepared several reports and provided
recommendations to the Select Committee regarding the need for legislation on the taking issue.Iw0
The Select Committee staff recommended the enactment of legislation in the form of a "balancing test" which would codify a procedure for courts to use in determining whether a governmental
regulation has "taken" private property. 0' The final report of the Select Committee rejected this approach and concluded that "[existing
judicial procedures are adequate . . . [to] determin[e] the validity of
land use regulations imposed under the authority of the police

power.'" 2 The final report did, however, recommend that a procedure be established to afford compensation or equitable remedies to a
property owner upon judicial determination that an individual prop-

erty owner has suffered an unequal burden as a result of a governmental regulation. 13 The Select Committee's recommendation was

without undue governmental influence or interference?
5. What are the rights of the public as a whole or as a more defined group in relation
to land?
6. Is there a feasible and realistic alternative to the present situation of judicial interpretation?
Id. at 2-3.
100. FINAL REPORT ON TIlM "TA INO IssuE," supranote 98, at 3.
101. Id. The staff report described the "balancing test" as follows:
If the landowner is able to establish a ___% diminution [in] value of his property
based upon a fair market value (e.g., highest and best use, present use, reasonable use,
etc.), or that he has suffered an economic loss as a direct result of the restriction, then
a presumption of a "taking" arises. The burden of proof then shifts to the governmental entity imposing the restriction to prove to the court that the land use restriction
is a valid exercise of the "police power." If the governmental entity is not able to
support the restriction in accordance with the "balancing test" the court shall find the
restriction to be a "taking." If the landowner cannot show that the value of the land
use has been diminished by at least _%,
the burden remains upon him, as the
challenger, to prove that the application of the balancing test will weigh in his favor
and result in a finding that the restriction is invalid.
Florida Senate Select Committee on Property Rights and Land Acquisition, FINAL STAFF REPORT
ON rFE "TAKINo Issue," at 62 (Jan. 5, 1976) (emphasis added) (available at Fla. Dep't of State,
Div. of Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.) [hereinafter FINAL STAFF REPORT]; see also Fla. HB 571
(1977) (proposing a similar burden-shifting procedure). The report then set forth 19 factors
which should be considered by the court in its "balancing test," including the economic impact
on the property owner and importance of the public interest served by the regulation. FiNAL
STAFF REPORT, supra, at 63-64.
102. FINAL REPORT ON THE "TAKING IssuE," supra note 98, at 5.
103. Id. at 6, 8 (recommendations 12 and 20). The Select Committee recognized that a property owner who suffered a greater burden than the public as a whole as a result of governmental
regulation is entitled to compensation or modification of the regulation. The decision of which
to provide, they concluded, should be left to the regulating entity.
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subsequently filed as Senate Bill 1270 in the 1976 Session.' "4 Although
the bill did not pass, it further laid the groundwork for the enactment
of Chapter 78-85, Laws of Florida(the Act).
In addition to Senate Bill 1270, as a result of the work of the Study
Commission and Select Committee, several other pro-private property
rights bills were introduced to address the taking issue.'0 5 The bills
proposed procedures for property owners to challenge land use regulations, criteria for judicial determination of a taking, and remedies for
aggrieved property owners; however, the bills were uniformly unsuccessful.'10 In the 1978 Session, however, legislation was enacted which
established procedures by which an aggrieved property owner could
challenge the denial of certain environmental permits as a taking.""'
This legislation did not attempt to statutorily define a taking, but did
set forth the remedies available to a property owner after a judicial
determination that the agency's action is "an unreasonableexercise of
the state's police power constituting a taking without just compensation.'"08
The Act implicitly adopts several of the policy statements of the
Study Commission and conclusions of the Select Committee.1 9 The
Act provides that any person "substantially affected" by a final
agency action with respect to a permit may seek circuit court review to
determine whether the agency's action constitutes a taking of the
property." 0 The action in circuit court must be filed within ninety
days of the final agency action."' Final agency action, as used in the
Act, does not necessarily require exhaustion of administrative remedies.1z In Bowen v. Florida Department of Environmental Regula104. The bill was filed by Senator Lewis, Chairman of the Select Committee; however, the
bill died in the Senate Committee on Natural Resources & Conservation. See FLA. LEacs., FNAL
LEGISLATIVE BEL INFORMATION, 1976 REouLR SESSION, HISTORY OF SENATE BILLS at 362, SB

1270.
105. See Robert M. Rhodes & Gary L. Brosch, Economic Adjustment Mechanisms-A New
Approach to the Taking Issue, 52 FLA. B.J. 431, 432 n.9 (1978) (providing an overview and
legislative history of bills addressing the takings issue filed in the 1976 and 1977 Sessions).
106. Id. at 431-32.
107. Ch. 78-85, 1978 Fla. Laws 124 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 161.212 (beach and shore preservation); § 253.763 (state lands); § 373.617 (water resources); § 380.085 (land and water management); § 403.90 (environmental control) (1993)).
108. Id. (emphasis added). Thus, chapter 78-85 has been described as "a remedies bill" and
"police power taking compensation legislation." See Rhodes, supra note 92, at 742. In the 1994
Session, an unsuccessful attempt was made to clarify the intent of the Act in reference to the
emphasized language. See infra text accompanying notes 212-14.
109. See FnA REPORT OF THE STUDY CoMMIssION, supra note 94, at 6-7 (policy statements 2
and 4); FINAL REPORT ON TH "TAsua IssUE," supra note 98, at 6 (conclusion 12).
110. Ch. 78-85, §2, 1978 Fla. Laws 124.
111. Id.
112. See Bowen v. Department of Envt'l Reg., 448 So. 2d 566, 569 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)
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tion,1'1 the court held that a property owner could institute an inverse
condemnation proceeding in circuit court following DER's denial, on
its merits, of a dredge and fill permit application.' 4 The court noted
that although the property owner could have appealed the denial to
the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund, doing
so would merely "postpone[] the effectiveness of final agency action
•

.

. not alter the nature of that action.""'

Accordingly, while the

property owner must obtain a statement from the agency as to the
permissible uses of his property before proceeding under the Act, the
owner is not required to exhaust administrative appeals.
Once the court determines that the agency action constitutes a taking of property without just compensation, it remands the matter to
the agency." 6 On "remand," the agency may either issue the permit,
compensate the property owner, or modify its decision to reduce the
burden on the property." 7 The agency's decision is submitted to the
court as a proposed order which does not become final until approved
by the court."' Attorney's fees are awarded to the prevailing party."19
The provisions of the Act are interesting in several respects. Specifically, the Act provides that "in determining the amount of compensation to be paid, consideration shall be given.., to any enhancement
to the value of the land attributable to government action."' 20 Thus,
(noting that final agency action does not require exhaustion of remedies), aff'd and adopted by
472 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 1985); Rhodes, supra note 92, at 745 n.30 ("An aggrieved party . . . may

wish to forego an administrative appeal and take an agency's final action directly into the circuit
court alleging a taking"); cf. Glisson v. Alachua County, 558 So. 2d 1030, 1035-36 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1990), rev. denied, 570 So. 2d 1304 (Fla. 1990); Williamson County Regional Planning

Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
113. 448 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (challenge arising under FLA. STAT. §§ 253.763,
403.90 (1981)), aff'd and adopted by 472 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 1985).
114. Id. at 568.
115. Id. at 569.

116. Ch. 78-85, §3, 1978 Fla. Laws 124.
117. Id. This language implicitly adopts the Study Commission's policy statement 2 which
recommended that "[any system of compensable regulation should allow regulating governments an opportunity to modify, rescind or grant a variance in lieu of compensation .... " lNHA.REPORT OF THE STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 94, at 6; see also FINAL REPORT ON THE

"TAKiCNo IsSE," supra note 98, at 6 (conclusion 12) ("The election of the alternative remedies
. . . should be left to the governmental entity imposing the regulation under the direction and to
the satisfaction of the courts.").
118. Ch. 78-85, §4, 1978 Fla. Laws 124. See also FINAL REPORT ON THE "TAKINO IssUE,"

supra note 98, at 6 (conclusion 12).
119.

Ch. 78-85, §5, 1978 Fla. Laws 124; cf. FiNAL REPORT ON rHE "TAKING IssuE," supra

note 98, at 8 (conclusion 20) (recommending the award of attorneys fees to the property owner);
CS for HB 485 &: HB 1967 (1994) (providing for an award of fees and costs to a prevailing

property owner).
120.

Ch. 78-85, §3(2), 1978 Fla. Laws 124. It is important to note that although the agency

makes the decision whether to compensate the property owner or pursue another alternative, the
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as an element of compensation, the owner may receive the "fictitious" value resulting from the property-use expectations created by
previous state and local zoning. Additionally, only final agency action
with respect to permits required under chapters 161, 253, 373, 380 or
403, Florida Statutes, may be challenged pursuant to the Act., 2 Thus,
the utility of the Act is somewhat limited. For example, the Act does
not apply to inverse condemnation claims resulting from a down-zoning of the property or a denial of a rezoning application. . 22 Finally,
under the reasoning in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of
Glendale v. County of Los Angeles,'23 an agency's decision on remand
to modify its decision to avoid a taking may not absolve the agency
from liability for a temporary taking of the property.' 24
As noted above, the Act does not attempt to statutorily prescribe a
2
formula for determining that agency action constitutes a taking.' It
leaves that determination to the courts. The "ad hoc" analysis used
by the courts in takings cases, however, continues to saddle property
owners and agencies with uncertainty as to constitutionally permissible land-use and environmental regulation. This unresolved uncertainty was the catalyst underlying the introduction of House Bill 1437
in the 1993 Session.

court determines the "appropriate monetary damages." Id. ("[1n determining the amount of
compensation to be paid, consideration shall be given by the court to any enhancement to the
value of the land attributable to government action.") (emphasis added). This is consistent with
the Study Commission's policy statement 4 which recommended that "[c]ompensation ... be
determined by [a] judicial proceeding rather than by administrative proceeding." FINAL REPORT
OF THE STUDY COMMSSION, supra note 94, at 7. This also is consistent with Select Committee
conclusion 16 relating to enhancement. See FINAL REPORT ON THE "TAKING ISSUE," supra note
98, at 7.
121.
See Ch. 78-85, §1(2), 1978 Fla. Laws 124. It is interesting to note that permitting under
chapter 163, FloridaStatutes, is excluded from this list. As discussed infra, legislation was discussed in the 1994 Regular Session which would have subjected chapter 163 permitting to the act.
Since the act is only subject to specified chapters, it implicitly rejects the recommendations of
both the Commission and the Select Committee. See FINAL REPORT OF THE STUDY COMMIsSION,
supra note 94, at 7 (policy statement 5 recommended any remedies be applicable to all regulatory
programs); FINAL REPORT ON THE "TAKING ISSUE." supra note 98, at 9 (conclusion 22 recommended applying any remedy only to chapters 161 and 380).
122. In those circumstances, the requirement that the property owner exhaust all administrative remedies before instituting an inverse condemnation proceeding would apply. See Glisson v.
Alachua County, 558 So. 2d 1030, 1035-36 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), rev. denied, 570 So. 2d 1304
(Fla. 1990).
123. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
124. Since the circuit court has already determined that the agency's original action constituted a taking of the property, "no subsequent action bi the government can relieve it of the
duty to provide compensation for the period during which the taking was effective." Id. at 321.
125. But see FINAL STAFF REPORT, supra note 101, at 63-65 ("balancing test"); FINAL REPORT OF THE STxUD COMMISSION, supra note 94, at 7 (policy statement 3).
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B. House Bill 1437 and the Governor'sPropertyRights Study
Commission II
To establish a "bright line" taking standard, Representative Harris
introduced House Bill 1437, the Private Property Rights Act, in the
1993 Regular Session.126 The bill would have defined in statute when a
regulatory taking occurs by creating a conclusive presumption that
any regulatory program which reduces the fair market value of private
property by more than forty percent constitutes a taking of the property. 2 In this regard, the traditional ad hoc judicial determination of
"how far is too far" would have been replaced solely by a diminution
of value formula. Once the forty percent threshold is crossed, the governmental unit which promulgated the regulation must either pay the
property owner the judicially determined just compensation' 2s or rescind the regulatory program as it affects the subject property.1 9 The
forty percent threshold would apply to all regulatory programs including those important land-use and environmental programs governed
1 30
by Chapters 161, 163, 380, and 403, FloridaStatutes.
The Legislature did not pass the bill as it was introduced. 131 Instead,
it created the Study Commission on Inverse Condemnation Law to
analyze the feasibility of a legislatively formulated "percentage of economic value diminution that would presumptively establish that a
governmental regulatory program has taken private property."' 32 The
Governor vetoed the Legislature's proposed commission and established his own commission with a more balanced, environmentally
sensitive membership.' 3 3 The Governor's Private Property Rights

126. The bill received significant bi-partisan support and was cosponsored by more than 50
members. See FLA. LEoss., FINAL LEGIsLATIvE Bsui INFORMATION, 1993 REoUx.AR SEssIoN, HIsTORY OF House Bnz.s at 268, HB 1437. The Senate companion, Senate Bill 1000, was sponsored

by 13 members. See FI.A. LaEos., FINAL LEaOS3ATW BuL INFORMATION, 1993 REouLAR SESSION,
HISTORY OF SENATE Bn.s at 89, SB 1000.
127. Fla. CS for HB 1437, §1 (1993) (proposed FLA. STAT. §73.31(1)).
128. Id. (proposed FLA. STAT. § 73.31(2)).
129. Id. (proposed FLA. STAT. § 73.34(l)). However, the bill would provide an exception for
any regulatory program which is preventing a property use that is "noxious in fact" or is harmful to public health or safety. Id. (proposed FLA. STAT. § 73.32).
130. Id. (proposed FLA. STAT. § 73.31(1)).
131. Committee Substitute for House Bill 1437 died on the House Calencfar on April 4, 1993.
FLA. LEoIS., F:NAL LEGISLATIVE Bim INFORmAvTON, 1993 REoUoAR SESSION, HISTORY OF HousE
Biu.s at 268, HB 1437.
132. Fla. CS for SB 1000, §1 (1993) (enrolled version).
133. Fla. Exec. Order No. 93-150, §§ 1, 2 (June 4, 1993) (creating the Governor's Property
Rights Study Commission II). In his veto message, Governor Chiles noted that the commission,
created by the Legislature,
purports to be another progressive step for Florida, but on the contrary, it appears to
be the first step in undoing [the state's important growth management and environ-
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Study Commission II (Commission) was charged with essentially the
same objective as the Legislature's, and was to present a report of its
findings to the Governor by January 30, 1994.134
The Commission was composed of seventeen members and was
chaired by former Supreme Court of Florida Justice Alan Sundberg. 35 The Commission held meetings across the state and received
public testimony from a number of individual property owners. Few
owners mentioned a desire for compensation for governmental overregulation of their property; rather, they merely complained of not
being able to use their property as they wished. 31 6 Sympathetic to these
comments, the Commission focused its efforts on the creation of an
inexpensive, expedited procedure by which a property owner could
seek a variance or modification of the regulatory program as it affected his property so that the property could be used in some manner. The procedure recommended by the Commission is a hybrid of
3 7
mediation and arbitration called "intermediation."1
Any property owner who believes that a state, regional, or local development order has "inordinately limited the effective and practical
use" of his property may petition for intermediation. 38 This procemental protection laws].... The study commission composition and the charge to the
commission as set forth in the bill do not provide a balance between the interests of
property owners and the appropriate role of government in protecting the environment and managing growth, [The bill] would stack the deck [against environmental
interests].
Letter from Governor Lawton Chiles to Secretary of State Jim Smith, 2 (June 4, 1993).134. Fla. Exec. Order 93-150, §4 (June 4, 1993). The deadline for submission of the report to
the Governor and Legislature was subsequently extended to February 28, 1994. See Fla. Exec
Order 93-354, §3 (Dec. 28, 1994).
135. Compare Fla. Exec. Order 93-150 § 2 (June 4, 1993) with Fla. Exec. Order 93-243 § 2
(Aug. 27, 1993) (increasing the number of Commission members from 15 to 17). The Commission was composed of Alan Sundberg (Chair), Ted Brown, Tom Dyer, John Finlayson, Clay
Henderson, Laurie Ann Macdonald, Arsenio Millian, James Nicholas, Bob Parks, Carol Roberts, Representative Dean Saunders, Democrat, Lakeland, Dep't of Comm'y Aff. Secretary
Linda Shelly, Earl Starnes, W.L. Thorton, Sheldon Watson, Dep't of Nat. Resources, Secretary
Virginia Wetherell, and Catherine Whatley. REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S PROPERTY RIO5IT.T
STuY ComnssoN II (Feb. 28, 1994) [hereinafter REPORT OF Tm CoMSssIoN].
136. See REPORT OF THE CommISoN, supra note 135, at 57.
137. Id. at 3-31 (proposed legislation). For a summary of the Commission's proposal, see id.
at 81-86. Part IV.A.2 and the Appendix of this Comment describe the intermediation process as
formulated in Committee Substitute for House Bills 485 and 1967. While this process is similar
to that proposed by the Commission, several major differences exist. See infra text accompanying notes 190-211.
. 138. REPORT OF Tm ComassisoN, supra note 135, at 7-8 (Commission's proposed FLA. STAT.
§ 163.06(5)). In determining whether a development order has "inordinately limited" the owner's use, the intermediator examines a number of factors. Id. at 18-20 (Commission's proposed
FLA. STAT. § 163.06(23)). These factors were taken directly from Reahard v. Lee County, 968
F.2d 1131, 1136 (11th Cir. 1992). As the court suggested in Reahard, emphasis is placed on the
owner's ability to attain his reasonable investment backed expectations. REPORT OF THE COmmsSION, supra note 135, at 5-6 (Commission's proposed FLA. STAT. § 163.06(4)(b)).
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dure is voluntary and a property owner is not required to seek relief
through intermediation before initiating an administrative challenge to
the development order or bringing an inverse condemnation suit
against the regulating entity. In intermediation, an impartial third
party called the "intermediator" first attempts to mediate the dispute
between the petitioning property owner and the regulating govern-

mental entity. 3 9 If mediation fails, the intermediator may recommend
adjustment to the development order at issue if he determines that the
order "inordinately limits" the owner's use of his property.' 40 As a
last resort, where appropriate, the intermediator may recommend that
the dispute be resolved by the governmental entity compensating the
property owner and purchasing an interest in the property. 4 A rec-

ommendation of adjustment or compensation may be made notwithstanding the fact that the development order's effect on the property
does not rise to the level of a constitutional taking. 42 The Commission
recommended that in the event the intermediator recommends com-

pensation, payment be made from a state fund and therefore suggested earmarking sixty million dollars annually from 4the
Florida
3
Communities Trust and documentary stamp tax revenues.

The Commission's final report contained proposed legislation to
create the intermediation procedure described above. 1" Representative
Dean Saunders,' 4 a member of the Commission, filed an earlier form
of this proposal as House Bill 1967.146 The Commission also recom-

139. Id. at 16-17 (Commission's proposed FLA. STAT. § 163.06(22)(a)).
140. Id. at 21 (Commission's proposed FLA. STAT. § 163.06(22)(b), (25)(b)).
141. Id. at 22 (Commission's proposed FLA. STAT. § 163.06(25)(c)). The intermediator may
recommend that the property owner be compensated, but may not recommend the amount of
compensation. This is determined by the Florida Communities Trust. Id. at 25-27 (Commission's
proposed FLA. STAT. § 163.06(28)).
142. See id. at 22 (Commission's proposed FLA. STAT. § 163.06(25)(c)). Because the circumstances to be examined by the intermediator are the factors announced in Reahard, the intermediator is, however, effectively determining whether the governmental action amounted to a
constitutional taking of the property.
143. Id. at 28 (Commission's proposed FLA. STAT. § 163.06(29)); see also id. at 88-92. The
issue of payment of intermediator's claims was hotly debated in the discussion of Committee
Substitute for House Bills 485 and 1967. See infra text accompanying notes 205-08.
144. The Commission approved the proposed legislation by a vote of 13 to 3. Members voting in opposition were Bob Parks, Laurie Mcdonald, and W.L. Thorton. Mr. Thorton submitted
a substitute proposal in which he recommended the Commission adopt the first seven policy
statements of the Study Commission. He also urged the adoption of legislation which would
create a statutory diminution-in-value taking standard. REPORT OF CoMsSMIoN, supra note 135
at Appendix B, 3 ("Such legislation should create a 'statutory taking' which would occur whenever ... regulations reduce the fair market value of property . .. by more than a majority
[(50%)] of its value.").
145. Dem., Lakeland.
146. Because the deadline to file member bills was February 8, 1994 and the final report of
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mended that a program be established "[tlo educate real property
owners as to the procedural aspects of the environmental and growth
management laws affecting their property and to assist them in complying with [those] laws." 4 7 This recommendation received no additional discussion during the 1994 Session. Finally, the Commission
adopted a conceptual statement endorsing the use of transfer of development rights (TDRs) as a "potential remedy for property rights concerns."' 1 The legislation proposed by the Commission authorizes the
intermediator to use TDRs as an adjustment mechanism. 4 9 A majority of the intermediation process proposed by the Commission was incorporated into a Committee Substitute for House Bills 485 and 1967
and received considerable debate during the 1994 Session; this legislation, however, did not pass. 150
C.

FederalLegislation

In 1988, President Reagan issued Executive Order 12630 (Reagan
Order). The Reagan Order requires each federal agency to review its
regulations before they are issued "to prevent unnecessary takings and
[to] account in decision making for those takings that are necessitated
by statutory mandate."'' Specifically, it requires any potentially confiscatory federal regulation to be examined before implementation to
avoid the costs of defending subsequent inverse condemnation suits by
5 2
affected property owners.
Senator Bob Dole'53 introduced a bill in 1993 which would have effectively codified the Reagan Order. This bill, dubbed the Private
Property Rights Act of 1993, provided that no federal land-use regula-

the Commission was not due until February 28, 1994, Representative Dean Saunders filed a draft
version of the Commission's work as House Bill 1967. FIA. LEuss., FINAL LEa isL.A.E BILL INFoRMATIan, 1994 REGAR SESSION, HISTORY OF HOUSE BIuS at 345-46, HB 1967 (filed Feb. 8,

1994). It was initially intended that House Bill 1967 be amended to incorporate the entire final
proposal of the Commission; however, as discussed in part IV.A., infra, House Bill 1967 was
ultimately combined with House Bill 485 in a more pro-property rights form.
147. See REPORT OF THE COMMISION, supra note 135, at 87-88. This program would be established at the Department of Environmental Protection, the Department of Community Affairs, each water management district, and in each local government larger than 50,000 people.
Id.
148. Id.at 93.
149. Id.at 22 (Commission's proposed FLA. STAT. § 163.06(25)(b)3.).
150. The bill died on the Calendar. FLA. LEOIS., FINAL LEo ssTxvE BILL INFORMATION, 1994
REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF HOUSE BLLS at 248, HB 485; See also discussion infra Part IV.A.
151. Exec. Order No. 12630, 3 C.F.R. 554 (1988), reprinted in5 U.S.C.A. § 601 (1989).
152. Id.§ (3)(e).
153. Repub., Kansas.
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tion would become effective until the Attorney General certifies that
the regulation complies with the Reagan Order.' 54 Senator Dole noted
that notwithstanding the protection of private property rights embodied in the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, legislation codifying
the Reagan Order was necessary because "those working in government, those who have sworn to uphold our Constitution, are not always as vigilant as they need to be.""' Dole had hoped to force a role
call vote on the bill before the summer of 1993;156 however, the bill
never reached the floor. In 1994, Dole again filed the Private Property
Rights Act and a number of other pro-private property rights bills
7
have been introduced."1
In a similar vein as the Reagan Order, as a part of the Growth Management Act of 1993,111 the Florida Legislature amended the intent
language of the Local Government Comprehensive Planning and
Land Development Regulation Act to provide:
It is the intent of the Legislature that all governmental entities in this
state recognize and respect judicially acknowledged or
constitutionally protected private property rights ...and that all
rules, ordinances, regulations, and programs adopted under the
authority of this act must be developed, promulgated, implemented,
and applied with sensitivity for private property rights and not be
unduly restrictive. . . . Full and just compensation or other
appropriate relief must be provided to any property owner for a
governmental action that is determined to. . . constituteo a taking,
as provided by law. 59
1
While similar to the underlying theory of the Reagan Order, this provision is obviously not as comprehensive, nor as binding as the Re-

154.

S. 177, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1993). This bill is identical to House Bill 905 which was

introduced in 1991. H.R. 905, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1991); cf. H.R. 1572, 102d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1991).
155. 139 CoNd. Rac. S610-11 (1993).
156. American Resource Information Network press release Federal Taking Bill Update,
Feb. 26, 1994 (on file with Florida State University Law Review, Fla. St. Univ. College of Law,
Tallahassee, Fla.).
157. See S. 2006, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (by Sen. Dole); S.1915, 103d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1994) (by Sen. Shelby); H.R. 3875, 103d Cong. 2d Sess. (1994) (by Rep. Tauzin); H.R. 3784,
103d Cong. 2d Sess. (1994) (by Rep. Smith); H.R. 1388, 103d Cong. 2d Sess. (1993) (by Rep.

Smith).
158. Ch. 93-206, 1993 Fla. Laws 1887.
159. Id. § 1, 1993 Fla. Laws at 1892. (Codified at FLA. STAT. § 163.3161(9) (1993)); see also
Powell, supra note 5, at 269-70.
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agan Order.16° It neither establishes specific factors for the
governmental entity to consider nor provides guidelines for the entity
to follow in recognizing or respecting property rights. 16' Moreover,
this amorphous, ideological intent language provides no bright-line
guidance to governmental entities because it does not define a taking
but merely refers to the current unsettled law.

IV. THE 1994 PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS LEGISLATION
For legislation as for sausages, 62
one should savor the result, but no
one should observe the making.

A.

Committee Substitutefor House Bills 485 and 1967: The
"Midnight Version"

Undaunted by the work of the Commission and without regard for
its upcoming recommendations, Representatives Harris and Ken

Pruitt 63 refiled the "Private Property Rights Act of Florida" as
House Bill 485. '6 The bill is virtually identical to the legislation Representative Harris introduced in the 1993 Session; as in 1993, the bill
garnered significant bipartisan support and had more than fifty sponsors. 6 House Bill 485 was referred to the House Judiciary Committee

160. For example, if the Order is codified through a bill such as Senator Dole's Private
Property Rights Act, a federal land-use regulation will not be effective until the Attorney General certifies that the regulation was scrutinized before promulgation to avoid the possibility of
effecting a taking of private property. See S. 2006 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994); Exec. Order No.
12630, 3 C.F.R. 554, 557 (1988) reprintedin 5 U.S.C.A. § 601(3)(e) (1989).
161. Cf. Exec. Order No. 12630, 3 C.F.R. 554, 555, 557 (1988) reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A.
§ 601(1)(c), (4) (1989) (requiring the Attorney General to establish guidelines).
162. This quotation is generally attributed Otto Von Bismark. See, e.g., Community Nutrition Institute v. Block, 749 F.2d 50, 51 (D.C, Cir. 1984). Notwithstanding the warning embodied
in this cynical view of the legislative process, Part IV of this Comment attempts to provide a
detailed legislative history of the 1994 private property rights legislation. Those with weak stomachs have been forewarned.

163.

Repub., Port St. Lucie.

164. See also Fla. SB 630 (1994) (companion bill sponsored by Senators Myers, Republican,
Hobe Sound; McKay, Republican, Bradenton; and Foley, Republican, West Palm Beach).
165. See Fla. HB 485 (1994). Representative Harris, addressing the Governor's Property
Right Study Commission II, stated his intent to refile his bill and noted that he might be willing
to incorporate the findings of the Commission depending upon their substance. See Governor's
Private Property Rights Study Commission II, tape recording of proceedings, Sept. 23, 1994
(available at Div. of Admin. Hearings, Tallahassee, Fla.). Sponsorship of House Bill 485 is
largely similar to that of House Bill 1437 in 1993. Compare FiA. LEois., FI, A. LEoisLATIv Bt
INFO AmToN, 1994 ROuLAR SaSSION, HISTORY OF HousE BtLJs at 247-48, HB 485 with supra
note 126.
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but was not placed on the Committee agenda until the sixth week of
Regufar Session in deference to the work of the Commission.'"
1. The "Midnight Version " Moves Through the House and
Senate
The private property rights battle was joined early in the 1994 Session. Supporters of House Bill 485 launched the first strike on the
second day of Session by holding a rally on the steps of the Old Capitol. 167 The keynote speaker at the rally was David Lncas of Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council'68 fame. Mr. Lucas spoke of his victory over "faceless bureaucrats" who regulated his beachfront prop-

erty and he emphasized the importance of fighting to protect private
property rights.'" The Commissioner of Agriculture, Bob Crawford,
and former Lieutenant Governor, Wayne Mixson echoed Mr. Lucas's
comments.1 0 The message which supporters of House Bill 485 were
sending to government
regarding their property was simple: "If you
7
want it-pay for it."' '
In return, opponents of the bill claimed that the bill would bankrupt the state and lead to the destruction of the state's remaining nat-

ural environment.'72 This argument, raised in opposition to House Bill
166. The bill was heard March 17, 1994, two weeks after the Commission issued its report.
This delay was at the direction of the Speaker to give the Committee an opportunity to analyze
the work of the Commission and to formulate a combination of House Bills 485 and 1967. See
FLA. LEGwS., Fni.AL LEOSL4TrE Bnt INFORMATION, 1994 RIouiAR SESSION, HISTORY OF HouSE
BiLas at 247-48, HB 485. At this meeting, the infamous "midnight version" combining House
Bill 485 and Representative Dean Saunders' House Bill 1967 was discussed. See infra text accompanying notes 175-78.
167. A number of the sponsors of the private property rights legislation as well as 300 to 500
supporters attended the rally. See Cheryl Waldrip, Lines are Drawn in Land Fight, TMPA TRM.,
Feb. 10, 1994, at Bl; David Damron, Property Rights at Issue, FLA. TD&sS-UNIoN, (Jacksonville), Feb. 10, 1994, at Bl; Bill Moss, Rally Pumps Up Property Rights Act, ST. PETERsaRo
TIsMS, Feb. 10, 1994, at 4B.
168. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992). Mr. Lucas has become somewhat of a private property rights
cult figure and has founded the Council on Private Property Rights, a national legal-action
lobby which campaigns against big government and excessive environmental regulation. See Brigid Schulte, Legal Jictory Heats Up the Dispute, TAUARMIssEE DEM., Jan. 3, 1994, at 7A.
169. See Damron, supranote 167, at B.
170. Waldrip, supra note 167, at Bl.
171. Private Property Rights Act of 1994 Press Release, Feb. 9, 1994, at 9 (on file with
Florida State University Law Review, Fla. St. Univ. College of Law, Tallahassee, Fla.).
172. In this regard, the Department of Environmental Protection noted that:
[tihe bill would severely disable the state's environmental regulation programs, making many of them pointless. It would be much less costly to simply rescind the programs or reduce the level of protection they provide directly by law. Payments for
investigations, litigation, and successful claims under [House Bill 4851 would, without
question, bankrupt the department, leave the state financially crippled, and force state
legislators to impose a severe fiscal burden on the state's population in order to bene-
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1437 in 1993, had been foreshadowed in 1976 when Senator Warren S.
Henderson'73 noted in a dissenting statement to the Final Report of
the Select Committee:
Such a recommendation [authorizing the governmental entity to
compensate the landowner, modify the regulation, or grant the
landowner a variance] could be misleading unless proper
appropriations are enacted establishing funds for compensation.
Without a proper funding mechanism, the governmental entity is
actually left with two alternatives: modification or variance. The
granting of modifications7 4 or variances could weaken necessary
environmental regulations.
In light of the fiscal impact of House Bill 485, the Speaker directed
that Representatives Harris and Pruitt work with Representative Dean
Saunders, the sponsor of the Commission's bill, to formulate a less
offensive property rights bill. From this directive evolved the Proposed Committee Substitute for House Bills 485 and 1967 (PCS).
The initial version of the PCS was simply a combination of the
Commission's proposed legislation and House Bill 485. Subsequently,
the language of House Bill 485 was deleted from the PCS and was
replaced with language amending the 1978 Act. 75 At the same time,
the Commission's proposal was amended at the direction of the sponsors to give the intermediation process some "teeth." This preliminary version of the PCS was made available to the public on March
11, 1994, and was placed on the Judiciary Committee agenda for

March 17.176
The PCS sponsors scheduled several workshops in which representatives from local government and environmental groups were invited

to critique the proposal and suggest changes to make the PCS less
offensive to their interests.'" As a result, numerous changes to the
fit a much smaller group.
Dep't of Envtl. Protect., Fiscal Analysis, Fla. HB 485, at 6 (Feb. 5, 1994) (on file with Judic.

Comm.). Similarly, the Florida League of Cities suggested that the bill "would virtually destroy
the fiscal stability of [smallI cities and could adversely affect their bond ratings. Bankruptcy may
become an alternative for these cities." Press Release, FloridaLeague of Cities Opposes Private
Property Rights Bill (emphasis in original) (on file with Florida Stale University Law Review,
Fla. St. Univ. College of Law, Tallahassee, Fla.).
173. Repub., Venice, 1967-84. Senator Henderson also served in the Florida House of Representatives from 1966-67 and the Florida Senate from 1963-66.
174. Fn ALREPORT ON THE "TAKiNo IssuE", supra note 98, at 10 (emphasis added).
175. Fla. PCS for HB 485 & HB 1967 (1994).
176. FLA. LEOsS., FINAl LEGISLATIVE BILL INFORMATION, 1994 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF
HousE BILs at 248, HB 485.
177. Attending these workshops were representatives from the Florida League of Cities,
Florida Association of Counties, 1000 Friends of Florida, the Florida Audobon Society, the
Department of Community Affairs, as well as several individual citizens.
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PCS were suggested. Incorporating these changes was not finished until well after midnight the night before the Judiciary Committee meeting and thus the revised PCS came to be known as the "midnight
version."'
At the Judiciary Committee meeting, opponents engaged in aggressive lobbying and political maneuvers. In light of misinformation and
the political tactics being used by the opponents of the "midnight ver-

sion," Committee Chairman Robert Trammell'7 temporarily passed
the bill so that it could be reviewed by all interested parties before the
Committee's next meeting."8
At the next Judiciary Committee meeting, after a brief discussion,
the Committee passed the "midnight version" by a vote of 21 to 4.181
In the Senate, however, the property rights bill did not fare as well.

Senate Bill 630 was on the agenda of the Community Affairs Committee on three separate occasions but was never voted upon.'82 In the
March 29 meeting, two amendments to the bill were discussed. The
"' would have conformed
first, by Senator Locke Burt, 83
Senate Bill 630
to the "midnight version."' The second, by Senator Howard For-

178. The author has the dubious distinction of having dubbed the amendment as the "midnight version." See Lucy Morgan, Critics Slow Property Rights Bill, But Can't Stop It, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 18, 1994, at 4B.

The midnight label was attached by committee intern Kent Wetherell as he printed the
final version out of his computer. Wetherell said the bill was available to interested
parties at 7:30 a.m. Thursday, about three hours before committee members began
considering it. Wetherell ... said he merely was attempting to note the time the final
version was produced and did not realize it would obtain a life of its own.
Id.
179. Dem., Marianna.
180. See Morgan, supra note 178. Representative Trammell noted that "[olur process allows
for midnight and last-second versions ... [blut we're not in such a hurry that it will pass out if
members of the committee don't want to pass it ....
[Tihe single most important thing we do is
to maintain credibility and give [interested parties] an opportunity to participate." Id.; see also
Bill Bergstrom, Vote on Bill to Compensate Landowners is Delayed, T.LLASSEE DEM., Mar.
18, 1994, at 4B.
181.

FLA. LEGIS., FINAL LEGISLATrvE BiI INFORMATION, 1994 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF

HOUSE BILLS at 248, HB 485. The dissenting members were Representatives Feren, Democrat,
Sunrise; McAndrews, Democrat, Royal Palm Beach, 1992-1994; Schultz, Democrat, Davie,
1992-1994; and Warner, Republican, Stuart- See Final Vote Sheet, CS for Fla. HB 485 & HB
1967 (on file with Judiciary Comm.). Even after the bill passed out of the Judiciary Committee,
the press continued to provide misinformation about the contents of the bill. See Backlash is Not
Surprising, FLA. TIMES-UNION, (Jacksonville), Mar. 29, 1994, at A10 (reporting that the bill
which passed out of the committee still contained the 40% diminution language of House Bill
485).

182. FLA. LEGIS., FINAL LEGISLATIVE BILL INFORMATION, 1994 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF
SENATE BiLs at 74, SB 630.

183.
184.

Repub., Ormond Beach.
See Fla. S. Comm. on Comm'y. Aff., Amend. 1 to SB 630 (on file with comm.).
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man, 8 consisted of a "fine-tuned" version of the Commission's proposed legislation.8 6 Neither amendment was adopted, and the bill died
in committee.
In the House, the "midnight version" languished in the Finance &
Taxation Committee and appeared to be dead. On April 7, however,
the bill was withdrawn from both the Finance & Taxation and the
Appropriations Committees and placed on the Calendar.S'7 This move
prompted speculation that the bill was on the Speaker or Rules Chairman's "must-pass list.""8 8 The bill never reached the floor, however,
and died on the Calendar. 9
2.

The Substance of the "'Midnight Version"

As noted above, the "midnight version" had two parts: (1) a
beefed-up version of the Commission's proposed legislation, 19 and (2)
amendments to the 1978 Act. ' 9'
The "midnight version" would provide that the rezoning of a specific parcel is an action reviewable through intermediation. 92 This recognizes that a comprehensive plan amendment or zoning ordinance
affecting a large parcel of property is a legislative act, whereas rezoning affecting a specific parcel is a quasi-judicial Act which should be
subject to stricter review. 193 Unlike the Commission's proposal, the
"midnight version" defines "real property" as used throughout the
bill.' 94 The sponsors decided to conform the definition in the "midnight version" to that in section 380.503, Florida Statutes. 95 In this

185.

Dem., Pembroke Pines.

186.

Senate Panel Delays Property Rights Vote, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Mar. 30, 1994, at C5.

For example, the Forman amendment would apply the intermediation process only to "land"
rather than "real property," delete the proposed amendments to the 1978 Act, and require that
the intermediation be conducted by a certified circuit court mediator. See S. Comm. on
Comm'y. Aff., Amend. 2 to Fla. SB 630 (on file with comm.). Commission Chairman Sundberg, Secretary Shelley, and former Secretary of the Department of Community Affairs Tom
Pelham supported this amendment.
187. FLA. LEGOS., FINAL LEGISLATIVE BELLINFORMATION, 1994 REoULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF
HOUSE Bn.LS at 248, HB 485.

188.
189.

See Wallace's "must-pass" bill?, ST. PETERSRURG TIMES, Apr. 8, 1994, at 18A.
FLA. LEGIS., FINA LEGISLATIVE BILL INFORMATION, 1994 REGULAR S9SSION, HISTORY OF

HousE Bits at 248, HB 485.

190.
191.
192.

Fla. CS for HB 485 & HB 1967, § 1 (1994).
Id. §§ 2-7.
Id. § I (proposed FLA. STAT. § 163.05(3)(c)).
See Board of County Comm'rs of Brevard v. Snyder, 627 So. 2d. 469, 474-75 (Fla.

193.
1993).
194. Fla. CS for HB 485 & HB 1967, § 1 (1994) (proposed FLA. STAT. § 163.05(3)(k)).
195. Id. Accordingly, as used in the "midnight version," "real property" means "any interest in land and may also include any appurtenances and improvements to the land." FLA. STAT.
§ 380.503(6) (1993) (emphasis added).
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regard, compensation for adversely affected "real property" would be
available to owners of land, land with buildings, and possibly even
billboards.196

To emphasize that intermediation is intended to be used by small
property owners and not as a large land owner relief act, the maximum compensation an owner could receive would be $500,000.1'9
Thus, a small property owner could use the process to obtain a recommendation of compensation or adjustment of the regulation restricting the use of his property. Intermediation is still beneficial to owners
whose property value exceeds $500,000 because the process could result in an adjustment of the regulation as well as "ripeness" for subsequent judicial action. Most of the time periods established by the
Commission's proposal were shortened in the "midnight version" to
streamline the process and make it more user-friendly for small property owners. '9
One of the more controversial changes in the "midnight version"
was the limitation placed on intervention. Where the Commission's
proposal allowed any substantially affected party to intervene, the
"midnight version" limited this intervention to a substantially affected party "who submitted oral or written testimony ... of a substantive nature which stated ... objections to or support for the

development order at issue."'' Thus, environmental groups such as
1000 Friends of Florida or the Florida Audobon Society would be
barred from participating in any subsequent intermediation unless
they actively participated in the initial hearings on the development
order.
The "midnight version" would not alter the underlying intermediation process as envisioned by the Commission. The first goal of the
intermediation process is to mediate a mutually acceptable solution. 2®
Where this fails, the "midnight version" would clarify that the intermediator may recommend adjustment, compensation, or that the development order remain undisturbed. 2°' The "midnight version,"
however, would give the intermediator a fourth option-adjustment

196.

Id.

197.

Fla. CS for HB 485 & HB 1967, § 1 (1994) (proposed FLA. STAT. § 163.05(4)). This

$500,000 figure was an arbitrary attempt by the Commission to distinguish between "large" and
"small" landowners. While some of the early drafts of the combination bill increased this figure
to $1 million, the $500,000 figure was eventually restored.
198. See, e.g., id. (proposed FLA. STAT. § 163.05(11)(a)) (shortened from six months to four
months).
199.
200.
201.

Id. (proposed FLA. STAT. § 163.05(13)(b)).
Id. (proposed FLA. STAT. § 163.05(18)(a)).
Id. (proposed FLA. STAT. § 163.05(20)).
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"plus." 20 2 Pursuant to this option, the intermediator may recommend
adjustment of the restriction and also that the owner be compensated
if the governmental agency rejects the adjustment recommendation. °3
The property owner would have a "ticket" to go directly to the Florida Communities Trust for compensation rather than first pursuing a
taking claim in circuit court if the intermediator's adjustment recommendation is rejected. 204

Another controversial change in the "midnight version" relates to
funding the intermediator's recommendation for compensation. The
Commission recommended that a Property Owner's Compensation
Fund of $60 million be established to pay for such recommendations. 2° 1 General revenue derived from the documentary stamp tax
would generate this fund.0 In contrast, the "midnight version"
would provide that one-half of the amount transferred each year to
the Florida Communities Trust from the proceeds of Preservation
2000 bonds would be available to satisfy the intermediator's recommendations for compensation.2 The "midnight version" provides
that title to property purchased by the Trust shall be vested in the
Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund.
The "midnight version" would allow the governmental entity to petition the Florida Land And Water Adjudicatory Commission (FLAWAC) to review an intermediator's recommendation of
compensation. 209 On review, FLAWAC could either determine that

Id. (proposed FLA. STAT. § 163.05(20)(c)).
203. Use of this option would be appropriate where the intermediator determines that there
is only one way in which the development order could be adjusted to remove the "inordinate
limitation." Where the government rejects this recommendation, its only remaining option
would be compensation.
202.

204.

Typically, where the intermediator's recommendation for adjustment is rejected, the

owner is merely "ripe" to bring an inverse condemnation proceeding against the governmental
entity. See Fla. CS for HB 485 & HB 1967, § 1 (1994) (proposed FLA. STAT. § 163.05(28)).
205. See REPORT oF THE CommssoN, supra note 135, at 28 (Commission's proposed FLA.

STAT. § 163.06(29)).
206.

Much of the revenue is derived from the documentary stamp tax funds Preservation

2000, and to ensure that this project would continue notwithstanding the draw placed on the
documentary stamp revenue by the Property Owner's Compensation Fund (Fund), the Commission recommended that the Fund's revenue be contingent on Preservation 2000 receiving $200
million per year. See id. at 91-92.
207. Fla. CS for HB 485 & HB 1967, § I (1993) (proposed FLA. STAT. § 163.05(27)). It was
argued, however, that purchasing property interests for purposes other than those enumerated in

the covenants of the Preservation 2000 bonds may be unconstitutional. It is also interesting to
note that the funds in the Florida's Community Trust would be used to satisfy inverse condemnation awards obtained pursuant to the 1978 Act, as amended. Id. § 7.
208. Id. § 1 (proposed FLA. STAT. § 163.05(26)). Because State funds were used to purchase
the property, it was argued that the state should own the property.
209. Id. (proposed FLA. STAT. § 163.05(23)).
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the owner is entitled to compensation by the Trust or that the owner
should be required to pursue his judicial remedies. 21 0 This FLAWAC
"appeal" was necessary because of the binding nature which was afforded to the intermediator's recommendation in the "midnight version." It is uncertain what record FLAWAC would base its
determination upon because the intermediator would not be required
to make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law in determining whether the governmental action constitutes an "inordinate limitation;" nor would the intermediator's recommendation be admissible
21
in subsequent litigation. 1
The second part of the "midnight version" amends the 1978 Act in
several respects. First, the definition of "permit" in the Act would be
212
expanded.
This change seems somewhat unnecessary because the
current definition includes any permit required by the chapter in
which the Act is incorporated. Second, the "midnight version" would
clarify that the court is to examine whether the governmental action at
issue is a taking pursuant to article X, section 6 of the FloridaConstitution. 213 This does not substantively change the Act and comports
21 4
with the original legislative intent.
The "ripeness" concerns of property owners also are addressed in
the amendments to the Act in the "midnight version." Specifically,
the amendments provide that "[flailure to pursue an administrative
proceeding shall not be a bar or impediment to the pursuit of circuit
court relief." 2 5 This amendment would overrule the line of cases
which require a final agency action and a final determination of the
property uses available to the owner before initiation of an inverse
216
condemnation suit.
Another controversial amendment to the Act relates to the attorneys' fees provisions. Currently, the Act provides that the prevailing
party receives fees and costs. 217 Arguably, this provision is a deterrent
for property owners to use the Act. It was proposed that the Act be

210. Id.
211. Id. (proposed FLA. STAT. § 163.05(21)). The recommendation is treated as an offer to
compromise and is therefore inadmissible pursuant to section 90.408, FloridaStatutes.
212. Id. §§ 3-6 (proposed amendment to FLA. STAT. §§ 161.212, 373.617, 380.085, 403.90
(1993)).
213. Id.
214. For a discussion of the legislative intent of the 1978 Act, see Rhodes, supra note 92.
215. Fla. CS for HB 485 & HB 1967, §§ 3-6 (1994) (proposed amendment to FLA. STAT. §§
161.212(2), 373.617(2), 380.085(2), 403.90(2) (1993)).
216. See, e.g., Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S.
172 (1985).
217. See FLA. STAT. §§ 161.212(5), 373.617(5), 380.085(5), 403.90(5) (1993).
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amended to award costs and fees to a prevailing property owner."1 8
Although this is similar to the award of fees and costs in eminent domain proceedings, this amendment was extremely controversial. 1 9 Finally, the "midnight version" would have enabled property owners
adversely affected by a development order required by part II of chapter 163, FloridaStatutes, to use the provisions of the Act. 220
B.

PotentialConstitutionalAmendments

"Should government compensate owners when damaging the value
of homes or other property?"
This "ballot title" could have appeared on the November 1994 general election ballot as the preface to a proposed amendment to the
Florida Constitution.2' If approved, this proposal could have seriously disrupted the delicate balance between private property rights
and land-use regulation in Florida. The voters, however, did not have
the opportunity to answer the question posed above because the Florida Supreme Court struck the proposal from the ballot.m In the event
this proposal gets on the ballot in the future, this Section will discuss
the reasons that the voters should answer the question with a resounding "no."

This amendment would make two substantial changes to takings
law. First, it would provide that any decrease in the value of property
effectively constitutes a taking, thereby requiring "full compensa218. Fla. CS for HB 485 & HB 1967, §§ 3-6 (1994) (proposed amendment to FLA. STAT. §§
161.212(5), 373.617(5), 380.085(5), 403.90(5) (1993)).
219. See id.§§ 73.091-.092 (1993) (attorney's fees provisions). Recently, the mandatory attorney's fees for property owners in eminent domain proceedings has come under fire. See Betty
Parker, Law of the Land: Taxpayers Pick Up the Tab for Legal Fights Between Government,
Property Owners, FT. MYERs NEws-PRSS, Aug. 8, 1993, at IA.
220. Fla. CS for HB 485 & HB 1967, § 2 (1994) (proposed FLA. STAT. § 163.055).
221. The proposal would amend article I, section 2 of the FloridaConstitutionby adding the
following language:
Any exercise of the police power, excepting the administration and enforcement of
criminal laws, which damages the value of a vested private property right, or any
interest thereirr, shall entitle the owner to full compensation determined by jury trial
with a jury of not fewer than six persons and without prior resort to administrative
remedies. This amendment shall take effect the day after approval by the voters.
See Tax Cap Committee, PROPERTY RIGHTS, FLOMA CoNsrrtioNL A3ENDMENT PETnToN
FoRm [hereinafter PETITION] (on file with FloridaState University Law Review, Fla. State Univ.
College of Law, Tallahassee, Fla.). It is curious that this proposal is amending article I, section 2
of the Florida Constitution relating to "Basic Rights" rather than article X, section 6 which is
generally regarded as the Takings Clause of the FloridaConstitution.
222. Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 19 Fla. L. Weekly S493, S496 (Fla. Oct. 4, 1994)
(finding the ballot title and summary "misleading"); see also Jim Smith, So You Want to
Amend the Florida Constitution?A Guide to Initiative Petitions, 18 NOVA L. REV. 1509, 1510
(1994) (discussing the difficulty in getting an issue on the ballot through the initiative process).
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tion" be paid to the owner. Clearly, this would overrule Mahon and
its progeny which held that governmental regulation could decrease
property value to an extent without rising to the level of a constitutional taking. 223 Similarly, the fact that the amendment is applicable to
''any exercise of the police power," including nuisance prevention,
will overrule the line of cases which held that all value in property
could be removed where the government was preventing a nuisance.7
By its terms, however, the amendment is only applicable to vested
property rights and is therefore somewhat limited. Under Florida law,
an owner's right to develop his property does not vest merely because
of the existence of a zoning classification when the owner purchases
the property. 23 Instead, the owner is required to take some action
with respect to his property in reliance on that zoning. The owner's
rights can vest, however, before the owner obtains a building permit.2 76 In Town of Largo v. ImperialHomes Corp.,227 the court stated
that an owner's rights vest where he has relied in good faith upon a
zoning act of local government by making a substantial change in position or by incurring monetary obligations.22 8 Accordingly, the denial
of an application to increase the density or change the zoning of the
property may not give rise to a claim for relief under this amendment.
Similarly, government's decision to down-zone the property may not
affect a vested property right where the owner is unable to establish
that his rights in the previous zoning are vested by proving detrimental
reliance.
The other substantive change in the law which would result from
this amendment regards "ripeness." Specifically, the amendment authorizes a property owner who is adversely affected by governmental
action to seek just compensation for the impact on his property

223. The language of the amendment suggests that full compensation is due for the entire
property subject to the governmental regulation even though the regulation may only affect a
small portion of the property. Under this standard, a decrease in value of the property by as

little as 10% could give rise to a claim by the owner for full compensation. Cf. Graham v.
Estuary Properties, Inc., 399 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 1981) (finding no taking with a 500/0
diminution
in value); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (finding no taking with a 87.5% diminution in value); Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (finding no taking with a 75%
diminution in value).
224.

See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 2897 (1992) ("'(H]armful

or noxious uses' of property may be proscribed by government regulation without the requirement of compensation.").
225. See City of Miami Beach v. 8701 Collins Ave., Inc., 77 So. 2d 428, 430 (Fla. 1954);
Town of Largo v. Imperial Homes Corp., 309 So. 2d 571, 573 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975); Franklin
County v. Leisure Properties, Ltd., 430 So. 2d 475, 480 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
226. See Town of Largo, 309 So. 2d at 572-73; Collins, 77 So. 2d at 430.
227. 309 So. 2d 571 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975).
228. Id. at 572-73; see also Leisure Properties,430 So. 2d at 479.
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"without prior resort to administrative remedies. ' 229 By allowing the
owner to bypass the administrative process, the amendment effectively
abandons the requirement that the property owner must obtain a final
decision regarding how he will be allowed to develop his property
prior to a judicial determination that the property has been taken.230
Thus, a reviewing court will have little or no record on which to base
a determination that the property has been taken since there will be
nothing to indicate the property uses available to the owner before
and after the governmental action.
A less offensive constitutional amendment was proposed in a joint
resolution introduced by Representative Harris in the 1994 Session.
House Joint Resolution 1953 (resolution) would have amended article
10, section 6 of the Florida Constitutionto provide:
A government regulation that effectively prohibits or restricts an
economically viable use of private property in a manner that reduces
the value of the property without the consent of the owner
constitutes a taking for a public purpose, which shall entitle the
owner to full compensation for the net diminution in fair market
value resulting from the government regulation; however, no
compensable taking results from regulatory action to prohibit or
restrict a use of property that was, under principles of law existing
prior to and independent of the regulation, already impermissible
and subject to restraint as a nuisance or unlawful activity.23'
While less detrimental to land-use regulation and environmental protection than the proposed initiative, the resolution did not attempt to
232
fairly balance the competing interests surrounding the taking issue.
The resolution was referred to the Judiciary Committee but was never
placed on an agenda and ultimately died in committee.2 33

229.

See PETrITON, supranote 221.

230. See Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172,
200 (1985); Bowen v. Department of Envtl. Reg., 448 So. 2d 566, 569 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984).
231. Fla. HJR 1953 (1994) (proposed amendment to FLA. CONST., art. X, § 6) (emphasis
added). A cursory reading of the resolution gives the impression that it is merely codifying the
Lucas decision; however, the resolution provides that restriction of an economically viable use
constitutes a taking. This is a more lenient, property-owner-friendly standard than the "all economically viable or productive use" standard enunciated in Lucas as the threshold for a per se
regulatory taking.
232. Specifically, the resolution does not consider the importance of the public purpose purportedly served by the regulation, nor does it consider any of the factors set out in Estuary
Properties.Instead, it merely focuses on the reduction in the value of the property resulting from
the regulation without the consent of the owner.
233.

See FLA. LEGIS., FINAL BILL INFORMATION, 1994 REOULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF HOUSE

BnlWs at 345, HJR 1953.
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CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Private property rights likely will remain an issue as the Legislature
continues to expand Florida's growth management and environmental
protection scheme to protect the state's remaining natural environment. In doing so, it is important that the Legislature remain focused
on one of the founding principles of this state and nation-the right
to own and use private property without unreasonable interference
from government. Future legislatures should pay close attention to the
work of Representatives Harris, Pruitt, and Dean Saunders during the
1994 Session on Committee Substitute for House Bills 485 and 1967.
With some slight modifications to appease the environmental interests
and local governments, the amendments to the 1978 Act found in the
"midnight version" could level the playing field for property owners
34
adversely affected by land-use and environmental regulations.
Specifically, remedies in the 1978 Act should be extended to property owners adversely affected by development orders issued under
chapter 163, part II, Florida Statutes. Additionally, the provision in
the Act awarding fees to the prevailing party should be amended to
require both parties, the agency and property owner, to pay their own
fees and costs unless the court provides otherwise. Finally, the Act's
standard of "unreasonable exercise of police power constituting a taking" should be clarified to comport with the original intent of the Act
and current takings jurisprudence by requiring the effect of the regulation to be a taking under article X, section 6 of the FloridaConstitution.
These recommendations, however, fail to address the core of the
taking issue. Specifically, they do not attempt to define the point at
which the public, rather than the property owner, should bear the burden of the impact of an environmental or land-use regulation on an
individual piece of property. As discussed above, however, it may be
difficult-if not impossible-to identify such a precise point. A more
feasible alternative is for the Legislature to adopt a statutory procedure for owners to challenge excessive regulation of their property as
a "taking" and to provide the courts guidance in their "ad hoc" takings analysis. Such a procedure could be modeled on the recommendation of the staff of the Select Committee and could proceed
substantially as follows:

234. These minor, relatively noncontroversial amendments will not provide a property owner
with "ripeness" at an earlier stage, nor will they provide a clear definition of what constitutes a
taking of property; they will, however, provide property owners greater access to remedies in the
event a regulation is judicially determined to have taken their property.
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(1) If the landowner establishes a 75% diminution in the fair market
value of his property directly resulting from an environmental or landuse restriction, then a rebuttablepresumption33 arises that the restriction has effected a "taking" of the property without compensation in
violation of article X, section 6 of the FloridaConstitution.
(2) The burden then shifts to the governmental entity imposing the
restriction to demonstrate a legitimate "police power" justification
for the restriction pursuant to the analysis set forth below. If the governmental entity cannot meet its burden of proof, the court shall determine that the restriction is a "taking" of the property.
(3) If the landowner cannot establish that the fair market value of
his property has been diminished by at least 75%, the burden of proof
remains on the landowner to demonstrate that the restriction constitutes a "taking" of the property pursuant to the analysis set forth
below.
(4) Where the court determines the restriction has effected a "taking," the landowner shall pursue his available remedies under Chapter
78-85, Laws of Floridaas amended above.23
A "balancing test" should be added to help the courts identify and
weigh the factors in its analysis. Such a "balancing test" should consist of the following elements:
Where the landownerhas the burden of proof"the court shall determine that the restriction effects a "taking" if the landowner proves by
a preponderance of the evidence that factors (a) and (b) outweigh factor (c).
Where the governmental entity has the burden of proof"the court
shall determine that the restriction does not effect a "taking" of the
property if the governmental entity proves by a preponderance of the
evidence that factor (c) outweighs factors (a) and (b).
Factors:
(a) The degree of diminution in value of the property resulting. from
the land-use restriction. As the diminution approaches 100%, the
court shall require a more important public purpose to justify the restriction as a valid exercise of the police power.

235. The rebuttable presumption should be of the type defined in section 90.302(2), Florida
Statutes. Accordingly, the governmental entity will be required to prove the "nonexistence of the
presumed fact" (i.e., that the 75% reduction does not effect a taking of the property).
236. There have been previous attempts to codify a burden-shifting taking analysis. See, e.g.,
Fla. HB 571 (1977). The analysis proposed in this Comment is distinguishable from House Bill
571 because the burden of proof is not shifted to the government until the property owner shows
a 75% diminution in value. In House Bill 571, the burden was shifted once "the landowner
[establishes) that the value of the land has diminished in value and that [he] has suffered an
economic loss [as a result of land-use regulation]." Id. § 3.
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(b) The extent to which the regulation curtails the owner's investment-backed expectations. Affirmative answers to the following questions shall be evidence that the restriction is imposing an inordinate
burden on the individual landowner:
(i) Whether the landowner's expectations are consistent with the
expectations and land use of neighboring property owners (i.e.,
whether the use prevented is the same as uses to which surrounding properties are devoted).
(ii) Whether the present use of the property is precluded.
(iii) Whether other reasonable alternatives exist to achieve the
public purpose purportedly served by the regulation while imposing a less severe burden on the landowner.
(c) The public purpose supporting the land-use restriction. Affirmative answers to the following questions shall be evidence that the landuse restriction is furthering an important public purpose:
(i) Whether the restriction is imposed to abate a public nuisance.
(ii) Whether the restriction is imposed to protect a significant natural resource.
(iii) Whether the restriction affects a large number of property
owners.

237

Except for the 75%0 rebuttable presumption, the proposed takings
analysis is merely a clarification and codification of the current taking
analysis. The intent of the rebuttable presumption is to recognize that
there is a point at which governmental regulation is presumed to be
excessive and unreasonable. The proposal arbitrarily establishes this
point where government has taken three-fourths of the value of an
individual's property. If government affects property to such an extent, it should have the burden of justifying the restriction, rather
than the property owner being required to show the impropriety of the
restriction.
The presumption above is easily distinguished from the 40% threshold which doomed House Bill 1437 in 1993 and House Bill 485 in 1994
(Property Rights Acts). This presumption is rebuttable, whereas in the
Property Rights Acts the 40% threshold acted as conclusive presumption. Pursuant to the recommended takings analysis the governmental
entity would not be foreclosed from establishing a legitimate police
power justification for the restriction's extreme impact on the prop-

237. The factors to be considered in the "balancing test" are merely intended to summarize
the factors considered under federal and Florida law. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2899-2901 (1992); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438
U.S. 104 (1978); Reahard v. Lee County, 968 F.2d 1131, 1136 (1lth Cir. 1992); Graham v.

Estuary Properties, Inc., 399 So. 2d 1374, 1380-81 (Fla. 1981); see also
supra note 101, at 63-66.
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erty. Unlike the Property Rights Acts where the 40% threshold could
only be overcome where the restriction at issue was preventing a "nuisance," the presumption above can be overcome based on a case-bycase balancing of the impact of the restriction on the property owner
and the public interest served by the restriction.
As the judicial decisions over the past seventy years indicate, there
is no simple solution to the takings issue. Similarly, legislative attempts to address this issue in Florida have been hard fought and incomplete. As Florida's environmental and land-use regulatory scheme
expands, however, the need for consistency and certainty in the taking
analysis is heightened. The recommendations above will provide both
property owners and governmental entities additional certainty and
should help maintain the delicate balance between private property
rights and environmental and land-use regulation well into the next
century. Without some degree of statutory clarification to current takings law, property owners in Florida will be forced to rely on the proverbial light at the end of the tunnel offered by the court in Florida
Rock Industries v. United States218 when it noted that "[o]ver time,

...enough cases will be decided with sufficient care and clarity that
the line [between permissive regulation and unconstitutional takings]
will more clearly emerge.''239 Property owners can only hope that this
light is not an oncoming train.

238.
239.

18 F.3d 1560 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1571 (emphasis added).
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